Burdens of proof, presumptions and standards of proof in criminal cases by Wodage, Worku Yaze
Note
DOI http://dx.doi.Org/10.4314/mlr.v8ii.8
Burdens of Proof, Presumptions and 
Standards of Proof in Criminal Cases
Abstract
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In jurisdictions that subscribe to adversarial mode of litigation, burdens and 
standards of proof have significant roles in the adjudication and determination 
of criminal cases. The operation of the principle of presumption of innocence in 
such jurisdictions determines issues of who bears what burden and the extent 
thereof. The Ethiopian criminal procedure system predominantly exhibits 
adversarial features, and there is the need for the comprehension and 
enforcement of the respective burdens and standards of proof borne by litigants. 
The constraints in clarity are more pronounced in those criminal law provisions 
that embrace some form of presumptions such as provisions on corruption 
offences. This note highlights how issues of burden and standard of proof are 
allocated as between prosecuting authorities and accused persons. Apart from 
explaining the nexus between the principle of presumption of innocence, 
burdens of proof and standards of proof, it indicates the implications of the 
operation of the principle of presumption of innocence upon the allocation of 
evidential and persuasive burdens of proof as between the state and the 
accused. It further outlines the effects of the various forms of presumptions 
upon the different kinds of burdens of proof.
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Introduction
Prosecution of corruption offences especially those involving possession of 
unexplained property in Ethiopia appear to be somewhat marred by confusions 
and dilemmas. Some court cases* 1 demonstrate the nature and extent of problems
* LLB, LLM, Assistant Professor, Bahir Dar University, School of Law.
1 See for example, the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie V. the SNNP Ethics & 
Anti- Corruption Commission case (Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No. 63014, Judgment given on Miazia 9, 2004 E.C). This is a case that 
involved prosecution of possession of unexplained property. It started at Hawasa City
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pervading in this area of the criminal law. Limitations in comprehending the 
unique nature and varying forces of the different forms of presumptions upon 
the different kinds of burdens of proof arising in criminal trials complicate 
matters. Sometimes we witness contradictory decisions among the different 
hierarchies of courts in identical cases that bear similar issues and similar 
evidence. It is apparent that the term is employed in many legal
proceedings, but often with less clarity. There are confusions regarding the 
interrelationship between burdens of proof and presumptions, and their interface 
with other issues such as the principle (right) of presumption of innocence.
This Note sets out to expound how issues of burden and standard of proof are 
allocated as between prosecuting authorities and accused persons in criminal 
trials in general. It explains the nexus between the principle of presumption of 
innocence, burdens of proof and standards of proof; it treats the implications of 
the principle of presumption of innocence upon the allocation of evidential and 
persuasive burdens of proof as between the state and the accused. It further 
outlines the effects of the various forms of presumptions upon the different 
kinds of burdens and standards of proof.
The first section of the note highlights the notion of burdens of proof and 
their operations in criminal trials. Section 2 considers the interaction that exists 
between the different kinds of presumptions and the various forms of burdens of 
proof. The third section addresses issues relating to standards of proof, followed 
by concluding remarks.
1. The Notion of Burdens of Proof and their Operations
1.1 Overview
Issues of burden and standard of proof are analyzed in the light of the material 
(actus reus) and moral (mens rea) elements of an offence in a charge. The 
analysis involves: (1) an examination of the allocation (distribution) of 
obligations to introduce evidence and to prove particular material and moral 
facts that establish an offence in a charge, and (2) a determination of the degree 
to which those facts must be proved.
High Court. Then it went all through the Appellate and Cassation divisions of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State Supreme Court and then 
after reached to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court. After 
thoroughly reviewing and revoking the decisions of the regional courts, the Cassation 
Division of the Federal Supreme Court remanded this case again to the Hawasa City 
High Court for re-trial. This Division has given a binding interpretation of Art 419 (1) 
of the Criminal Code (2004). The interpretation has to do with burdens of proof 
standards of proof and presumptions.
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It is a legal truism that burdens of proof and standards of proof have 
meanings in relation to ‘facts in issue’ and ‘relevant facts’ in particular cases. 
There are no burdens of proof in the vacuum.2 Likewise, standards of proof 
cannot be perceived in the vacuum- both burdens of proof and standards of 
proof do exist in relation to facts, more specifically, ‘facts in issue’ and/or 
‘relevant facts’.3
Allocation of burdens of proof, the evidential and persuasive burdens in 
particular, is basically a substantive law matter.4 Often, the legislative body 
(sometimes judges during legislative silence in a given common law-adversarial 
jurisdiction) determines, ahead of litigation, as to which party is under duty to 
lead evidence and also determines the party which bears the obligation to prove 
particular facts which may fall within the ‘facts in issue’ or other ‘relevant 
facts’. Such allocation of burdens of proof is made taking into account various 
factors and policy determinations. These include:5
a) The natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring change,
b) Special policy considerations such as those disfavouring certain defences,
c) Convenience,
d) Fairness, and
e) The judicial estimate of the probabilities.
Apart from or in lieu of these, the pleading of parties may sometimes locate and 
determine as to which party bears one or another form of burden of proof. 
Above all, the principle of presumption of innocence, locates and determines, 
ahead of litigation, as to which party is under duty to lead evidence and as to
2 The notion of burdens of proof is properly raised in jurisdictions that adhere to the 
party-driven, common law- adversarial systems of procedure and evidentiary styles. It 
is equally important in continental law - inquisitorial (non-adversary) systems as there 
are no, strictly speaking, parties’ evidence and parties’ presentation of evidence. For 
further details on this issue and for better knowledge on the underlying distinctions 
between adversarial and inquisitorial (non-adversarial) systems read Mirjan Damaska 
(1973), ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: 
A Comparative Study’, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 506 ff; Ronald J. Allen (2012), ‘Burdens 
of Proof, at 1- 24; available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146184> (Visited on 2 
December 2013).
3 Generally speaking, the ‘facts in issue’ in criminal proceedings are those disputed 
issues of fact which the prosecution must prove in order to succeed along with the 
issues of fact, if any, which the accused must show that there is some (admissible) 
evidence in support of his defence. On the other hand, ‘relevant facts’ are those other 
facts that are connected or have some relationship with facts in issue. (See Raymond 
Emson (2004), Evidence, 2nd Ed., at 7 & 421).
4 Dennis, I. H. Dennis (2002), The Law of Evidence, 2nd ed., (Reprinted, 2004), at 371.
5 See Stephen I. Dwyer, ‘Presumptions and Burden of Proof’, 21 Loy. L. Rev. (1975), at 
380 (quoting McCormick).
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which party bears the obligation to prove the ‘facts in issue’ or other ‘relevant 
facts’ as may arise in each individual case.
1.2 The Notion, kinds and Operations of Burdens of Proof
The notion of “burden of Proof’ is one of the most elusive terms in the law of 
evidence,6 and it may be used in a number of different senses.7 Depending on 
the context, it may refer to evidential burden, or it may denote persuasive 
burden, or it may signify tactical burden. In the literature, academic discourse 
and law-making, it is often employed indiscriminately without implying any one 
of these specific meanings. In such cases, one will be required to search for the 
particular meaning in which the term is employed in that particular context. As 
there are varieties of meanings of this term, it is more appropriate to use the 
expression ‘burdens of proof than simply to employ the singular term ‘burden 
of proof. In the strictest legal parlance, however, evidential and tactical burdens 
of proof are not truly burdens of “proof’.8
In the sense of evidential burden, the term ‘burden of proof refers to the 
obligation of a party to a dispute to lead evidence to show his case. This is what 
is commonly referred to as ‘burden of adduction (production) of evidence’ or 
‘burden of going forward with evidence’, or simply as ‘evidential burden’. A 
party that bears evidential burden is required to point out and to present or
6 Id, at 377; CRM Dlamini (2003), ‘The Burden of Proof: Its Role and Meaning’, 14 
Stellenbosch L. Rev. at 68; Colin Tapper (1999), Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 9th 
ed., at 106.
7 Tapper, supra note 6, at 106-108; A.A.S Zuckerman (1989), The Principles of 
Criminal Evidence, at 104-109; Emson, supra note 3, at 420-421; Dennis, supra note 
4, at 369-373.
8 These two do not envisage a duty of convincing of fact-finders about the truthfulness 
of one’s side of story in a case. only the legal burden of proof (persuasive burden) 
stands to be the proper burden of proof deserving the name in judicial proceedings. 
There is yet another unfortunate circumstance in relation to the usage of the term 
“proof’ both in law-making and in scholarly works. In its strict and proper sense the 
term “proof’ refers to the process and end result of evidence and/or other probative 
materials (such as formal admission (plea of guilt), judicial notice and to some extent 
presumptions) upon the minds of decision-makers; yet, the word ‘proof’ is often used 
as a synonym of the term ‘evidence’. The Amharic equivalent for the proper sense of 
proof is ‘^07T/^07T’ while the equivalent of the term ‘evidence’ is ‘^ft^£’. 
‘Evidence’ is just one, actually the basic one, of probative materials (device) that help 
proving facts under investigation. This input (means) must be distinguished from the 
process and end product- state of factual persuasion, i.e., the degree of conviction 
created in the mind of the judge by the force of evidence and/or other probative 
device, or state of being proved or disproved in the process. N.B. ‘proof’ is the noun 
form while ‘prove’ is the verb.
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introduce enough evidence that help putting a matter in issue. As Tapper 
observed, evidential burden refers to: “The obligation to show, if called upon to 
do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or 
non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being had to the standard of proof 
demanded of the party under such obligation.” [Emphasis added].9
A party upon whom such an obligation is imposed is not required to prove 
something thereby convincing decision-makers as to the truthfulness of his side 
of the story in respect of that issue for which he bears evidential burden. in other 
words, evidential burdens do not envisage an obligation of proving. As Emson 
notes, “[t]he evidential burden is not a burden of proof as such but rather an 
obligation to demonstrate that sufficient evidence has been adduced or elicited 
in support of an assertion of fact so that it can become a live issue” [Emphasis in 
the original]. 10 Zuckerman also states that such burden “imposes an obligation 
to adduce some evidence in support of the existence of some facts in issue, 
without imposing any duty to generate any particular degree of confidence in the 
adjudicator’s mind.”11
in criminal proceedings, in respect of the substantive matters in a criminal 
charge, it is the prosecutor that always has to open the case and lead evidence12 
The prosecutor has to adduce evidence in support of the facts in issue, which 
pertain to the material and moral elements of the offence in its charge. The 
principle of presumption of innocence to which any criminally accused person is 
entitled compels prosecuting authorities to bear this initial evidential burden.13
9 Tapper, supra note 6, at 109
10 Emson, supra note 3, at 420.
11 Zuckerman, Supra note 7, at 107.
12 The presumption of innocence protects the accused from being compelled to lead 
evidence. But, if collateral issues such as criminal irresponsibility due to minor age, 
or insanity are raised by an accused person, the accused bears the burden of leading 
evidence on such collateral issues. See Rinat Kitai (2002), ‘Presuming Innocence’, 55 
Okla. L. Rev. at 258 (footnote omitted); Andrew Ashworth (2006), ‘Four Threats to 
the Presumption of innocence’, 10 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof, at 249.
13 As Ashworth (Ibid) noted the “presumption of innocence is a moral and political 
principle, based on a widely shared conception of how a free society (as distinct from 
an authoritarian society) should exercise the power to punish.” It is not factual 
presumption. Ashworth (Ibid) wrote “there is no rational connection between being 
prosecuted and being innocent, and indeed the statistics on guilty pleas and 
convictions suggest that most of those prosecuted are guilty.” It is important to note 
that the principle of presumption of innocence places evidential and persuasive 
burdens of proof upon the state (prosecutor) and that determines the extent of proof 
that is required of the prosecutor to discharge its ultimate burden of proof. In its 
broader sense, it could go to the pre-trial criminal process to imply, guide and
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In some exceptional circumstances provided by law, the prosecutor may be 
partly relieved of this burden for some of the material or moral elements of the 
offence or in respect of some incidental or circumstantial matters in the charge.14 
This occurs in cases where the accused, unlike the prosecutor, is in a better 
position to produce some form of evidence that is within his personal knowledge 
or within his reach. In such circumstances the legislature may determine to ease 
(but not to exonerate totally) the evidential burden of the prosecutor by 
employing some form of presumption to particular facts or related 
circumstances that are deemed to be within the knowledge or reach of the 
accused.15 This scenario involves the reversal (“shift”) of evidential burden of 
proof in respect of such material or moral or other circumstantial facts. This is 
more appropriately referred to as easing of the evidential burden of the 
prosecutor.16 What is eased or reduced in such instances is the partial (and not 
the whole) evidential burden of the prosecutor.
The prosecutor loses on the case if it fails to preliminarily discharge its 
normal or reduced evidential burden with the required degree of persuasion. 
Failure to produce prima facie proof 17 in criminal proceedings leads into the 14 15 16 17
regulate the behavior of the state, state organs and the general public on how they 
should treat suspected persons.
14 See Lindy Muzila, Michelle Morales, Marianne Mathias, and Tammar Berger (2012), 
On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption; Washington, DC: 
World Bank. DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9454-0. License: Creative Commons 
Attribution CC BY 3.0, at 30-31, available at:
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>(last visited 15/8/2013); International 
Council on Human Rights Policy (2010), ‘Integrating Human Rights in the Anti­
Corruption Agenda: Challenges, Possibilities and Opportunities’, at 65-66; available 
at: <www.ichratorg/files/reports/58/131b_report.pdf>, (last visited on 12/08/ 2013); 
Ndiva Kofele-Kale (2006), ‘Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and 
Interests in Combating Economic Crimes’, 40 Int’l Law, at 931-942.
15 Kofele-Kale, Supra note 14, at 931-942; Bertrand de Speville (1997), ‘Reversing the 
Onus of Proof: Is it Compatible with Respect for Human Rights’, paper presented to 
the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, available at: 
<http://8iacc.org/papers/despeville.html> (last visited on 21 November 2013).
16 See Byron M. Sheldrick (1986), ‘Shifting Burdens and Required Inferences: 
Constitutionality of Reverse Onus Clauses’, 44 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev., at 182; 
Maud Perdriel-Vaissiere (January 2012), ‘The Accumulation of Unexplained Wealth 
by Public Officials: Making the offence of illicit enrichment enforceable’, U4 Brief, 
No 1, at 2-3, available at: <www.U4.no>, at 33 (last visited on 17/08/2013). Many 
scholars and court judges have expressed their opinion that such a reversal (easing of) 
an evidential burden would not contradict with the basic essence of presumption of 
innocence (Ibid); See also Kofele-Kale, Supra note14, at 924-944.
17 The expression prima facie proof (also loosely, but awkwardly, employed as prima 
facie evidence or as prima facie case) signifies that state of condition in which in the
258 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
acquittal of the accused in the middle of the trial process. This is what is often 
expressed as the order of ‘no case motion’ or ‘no case to answer’.18 *
On the other hand, if the prosecutor successfully discharges the normal or 
reduced evidential burden, the court orders the accused to enter into his defence. 
It is at this point that the accused will be required to shoulder and to discharge 
his burden by leading rebuttal or counter-evidence. This is the point whereupon 
the other type of burden of “proof’, in the broad sense of the term, will come 
into the picture- that is tactical burden of proof. Often, this is expressed by the 
term “shift of burden of proof’. More appropriately, this is referred to as the 
‘placing of an evidential burden on an opponent’ or, as ‘a shift of the evidential 
burden of proof from the prosecutor to the accused’.
in the sense of tactical burden, the term ‘burden of proof’ refers to what a 
party to a dispute may do if the other party that bears evidential burden 
successfully discharges its evidential burden. This is what is also termed as the 
provisional burden19 In brief, this refers to the obligation of the other party 
(against whom prima facie proof is submitted) to lead some counter or rebuttal 
evidence. This burden does not come into the picture if the court, after making a 
preliminary (provisional) assessment of the evidence of the party that bears 
persuasive burden (and thus leads evidence) concludes that there is ‘no case to 
answer’. In criminal proceedings, a judge of a given court orders an accused to 
enter into his defence only if it is sufficiently convinced that a reasonable fact 
finder will convict such an accused if he fails to produce some counter or 
rebuttal evidence. Once the judge gives an order that the accused has to enter
absence of evidence to the contrary some fact is (or may or must be) considered as 
proved or established. In criminal proceedings, it often refers to the provisional 
(temporary) proof beyond a reasonable doubt degree of conviction. It is said to be 
provisional or temporary for there is a possibility for the accused to rebut or counter 
such degree of proof. It is this state of conviction created in the mind ofjudges that is 
provisional not the evidence introduced. See Zuckerman, Supra note 7, at 53-54.
18 Ibid.9 Tapper, supra note 6, at 107; Emson, supra note 3, at 422. Emson wrote:
“If the party bearing an evidential burden on an issue manages to discharge it this is 
said to place on his opponent a ‘tactical’ or ‘provisional’ burden to adduce 
evidence in rebuttal. The tribunal of law's ruling means that sufficient evidence has 
been adduced on the issue for the tribunal of fact to find, at the end of the trial, that 
it has been proved. If the opponent fails to adduce evidence to show the contrary it 
is quite possible that the issue will be proved against him. It would therefore be to 
the opponent's advantage to adduce evidence in rebuttal rather than simply hope 
the tribunal of fact does not find in the proponent's favour: he is obliged, in a 
tactical sense, to adduce evidence of his own. If the prosecution [has] established a 
prima facie case against the accused it is not incumbent on him to adduce evidence 
of his own, for the jury may decide in his favour anyway.”
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into his defence, it would be the responsibility of that accused to lead some 
counter or rebuttal evidence. Failure on the part of the accused to discharge his 
tactical burden by adducing some rebuttal (counter) evidence in such 
circumstances entails a potential risk of conviction. As Dennis’s observes:
When a party has discharged an evidential burden and raised an issue for the 
court to consider, there arises a tactical onus on the other party to respond 
with some rebutting evidence. There is no legal obligation to adduce 
(further) evidence on the issue, but the party against whom the evidence has 
been adduced increases the risk of losing on the issue if nothing is done to 
challenge the evidence.20
In the strict legal parlance, the term ‘burden of proof refers to the obligation of 
a party to persuade the existence or non-existence of a disputed matter of fact to 
the satisfaction of judges with the necessary amount and quality of evidence 
and/or other probative devices. As Tapper notes, it denotes “the obligation of a 
party to meet the requirement that a fact in issue be proved (or disproved) either 
by a preponderance of the evidence [in civil cases] or beyond reasonable doubt 
[in criminal cases].”21 This is the true burden of proof that determines which 
party in a proceeding is responsible to prove or disprove a particular fact(s) in 
issue under risk of losing on an issue or on the whole of the case, as the case 
may be. It is this burden that determines which party is under an obligation to 
lead evidence of a particular fact and convince the court thereof; it this burden 
that mainly determines the party who will lose if the court is not satisfied that 
the fact has been proved. This burden of proof is also referred to as legal 
(persuasive) burden, or probative burden, or risk of non-persuasion, and it fixes 
the party that loses on an issue of fact or on the whole of the case.22 Emson 
writes:
The legal burden of proof [...] is the obligation the law imposes on a party 
to prove a fact in issue. In effect it is no more than a risk-allocation 
mechanism: the party who bears the legal burden on an issue carries the risk 
of losing on that issue if the evidence relevant to it is evenly balanced or 
non-existent. It is for that party to adduce sufficient evidence to persuade the 
tribunal of fact that his version of events is correct.23
20 Dennis, supra note 4, at 373-374.
21 Tapper, supra note 6, at 108.
22 Other interchangeable terms include ‘fixed burden of proof’, or simply as ‘ultimate 
burden’, See Ibid., 108; Emson, supra note 3, at 419; Zuckerman, supra note 7, at 
106; Dennis, supra note 4, at 371. Zuckerman notes (at 106) that each of the 
alternative terms may, depending on the context, carry much more specific 
connotations.
23 Emson, supra note 3, at 419.
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As Professor Allen noted “the substantive law determines who has the burden of 
persuasion through its articulation of elements and defenses.”24 And, under 
normal circumstances, the party bearing the legal burden of proof on a fact in 
issue also bears the evidential burden to make it a live issue.25 Many legal 
scholars have observed that the evidential burden is a function of the burden of 
persuasion.26 In respect of the substantive contents (ingredients of an offence) 
of a criminal charge, it is the prosecutor that normally bears legal burden of 
proof. The prosecutor is duty bound to convince that the accused has committed 
the actus reus. It is also duty bound to persuade judges that the accused did it 
with blameworthy state of mind (mens rea) unless the specific offence is one of 
strict criminal liability.
Unless the law makes partial easing (reducing) of the prosecutor’s burden,27 
the prosecutor is required to establish or prove each and every essential material 
and moral ingredients of an offence stated in a charge. The operation of the 
principle of presumption of innocence commands that the prosecutor bears the 
duty of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Proving of guilt in turn 
presupposes establishment of each and every essential material and moral 
ingredients of an offence. No accused person is required to prove his innocence 
in modern criminal justice systems. It is the accuser- the prosecutor- that must 
prove guilt. And the prosecutor’s legal burden is fixed; it does not shift to an 
accused any time during the course of a trial.28 The expression ‘fixed burden of 
proof is thus interchangeably used with ‘persuasive burden’ or ‘legal burden’ of 
proof. As Dennis observes, “[l]egal burdens are allocated by rules of law and are 
fixed at the beginning of the case. They do not shift during the course of a trial” 
[Emphasis added].29
Only in very few exceptional circumstances may a reversal of legal burden 
of proof be allowed in respect of some (but not all) ingredients in certain 
offences.30 This occurs in cases where the legislative body finds it that doing so
24 Ronald J. Allen (2011), ‘Standards of Proof and the Limits of Legal Analysis’, at 3; 
available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830344> (Last visited on 23 December, 
2013).
25 Emson, supra note 3, at 421; Zuckerman, supra note 7, at 108.
26 See Allen, supra note 2, at 11 citing John T. McNaughton (1955), ‘Burden of 
Production of Evidence: A Function of Burden of Persuasion’, 68 Harv. L. Rev., at 
1382.
27 If the law made partial easing (reducing) of the prosecutor’s burden, the obligation of 
the latter to establish/prove would be limited to those that remain under its shoulder.
28 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 371.
29 Ibid.
30 Kofele-Kale, supra note 14, at 943; de Speville, Supra note 15, at 2. See also David 
Hamer (2007), ‘The presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing
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is necessary, appropriate, reasonable and proportional vis-a-vis the threat an 
exceptionally serious crime poses to society, and in view of the difficulty the 
prosecuting authorities face to produce evidence.31 In some cases, the accused, 
not the prosecutor, may be in a better position to produce evidence that is within 
his personal knowledge or within his reach. Such may be the case in grand 
public corruption criminal cases wherein higher or senior public officials are 
prosecuted. Even in such cases the ultimate burden of proof remains with the 
prosecution. The other name for persuasive burden is thus known as the 
‘ultimate burden’.
From this brief exposition, it is understandable that the form of burden of 
proof that is placed upon litigating parties differs greatly and the duty that each 
form of burden of proof imposes upon a party varies substantially. Failure to 
successfully discharge one’s form of burden of proof at the right time with the 
required intensity of proof entails irreversible consequences. As most of the 
confusions and dilemmas in Ethiopian criminal trials seem to surface in these 
areas, it is appropriate to quote at length what Dennis states in respect of the 
distinction between evidential burden and persuasive burden:
When a judge is deciding whether an evidential burden has been discharged, 
he looks only at the evidence favouring the party who bears the evidential 
burden. The question for decision is whether the favourable evidence is 
sufficient by itself to raise an issue for the court to consider; the fact that 
there may be substantial other evidence contradicting the favourable
Act’, 66 Cambridge L. J, at 148-149 (discussing the compatibility or otherwise of 
reversal of persuasive burdens of proof with the principle of presumption of 
innocence and further analyzing the various factors that could be considered in 
determining such compatibility or incompatibility. The factors listed are ‘seriousness 
of offence’, ‘gravamen of offence’, ‘exigency of threat posed’, and ‘pragmatics of 
proof’.)
31 Ibid; Jayawickrama et al have written: ... with the emergence or escalation of 
organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption, in many legal systems the 
operation of other statutory presumptions of law or fact have been considered 
necessary for the effective administration of criminal justice. The pre-eminent 
position accorded to the presumption of innocence means that these presumptions of 
law or fact require to be confined within reasonable and appropriate limits. In no 
circumstances should an accused be required to do more than raise a reasonable 
doubt as to his or her guilt. Accordingly, a presumption that relieved the prosecution 
of part of its burden of proving all the elements of a criminal charge, so that a 
conviction could result despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of 
an accused person, would be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.
See Nihal Jayawickrama, Jeremy Pope & Oliver Stolpe (2002), ‘Legal Provisions 
to Facilitate the gathering of evidence in Corruption Cases: Easing the Burden of 
Proof, 2 Forum on Crime and Society, No.1, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
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evidence is immaterial at this stage. When a fact-finder (judge, jury or bench 
of magistrates) is deciding whether a legal burden has been discharged, the 
fact-finder looks at all the evidence adduced in the case. Thus the fact-finder 
will take into account the evidence which first served to discharge the 
evidential burden plus any other evidence which tends to confirm or rebut it. 
[...] The discharge of an evidential burden does not involve a decision that 
any fact has been proved. All it signifies is that a question has been validly 
raised about the possible existence of a material fact; the decision is only 
that enough evidence has been adduced to justify a possible finding in 
favour of the party bearing the burden. [....] The discharge of the legal 
burden occurs at a later stage in the trial, when the fact-finder is required to 
decide on the existence or non-existence of facts whose possible existence is 
in issue [Emphasis added]. 32
The next section briefly deals with some distinct scenarios that arise in the 
course of the interplay between burdens of proof and presumptions.
2. Interplay between Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in 
Criminal Trials
Burdens of proof and presumptions are intimately related concepts.33 The latter 
are legal devices that enable courts to draw conclusions regarding the existence 
or otherwise of facts from the establishment of other preliminary facts. As 
briefly discussed below, the operations of various forms of presumptions entail 
different consequences as they affect the normal operation of the various forms 
of burdens of proof thereby determining the respective roles and responsibilities 
of parties.34
Of the two types of presumptions, presumptions without basic facts and 
presumptions with basic facts,35 only the latter type is relevant for us now. This 
is because many of the presumptions that we find in criminal law provisions
32 Dennis, supra note 4, at 371 (Emphasis in the original) (Also, footnote omitted). 
David Hamer also writes: “Whereas the reverse persuasive burden requires the 
defendant to prove his innocence on the balance of probabilities, the reverse 
evidential burden only requires the defendant to raise a matter of exculpation as a 
genuine issue. The Prosecution will then carry the persuasive burden of negating the 
matter.” See Hamer, supra note 30, at 143.
33 Allen, supra note 2, at 24 & 30; Dennis, supra note 4, at 419-421; Dwyer, supra note 
5, at 377.
34 Dwyer writes: “in most cases, a presumption imposes the burden of proof upon the 
party against whom the presumption is operable. In certain cases, however, a 
presumption creates a burden which legally cannot be overcome” (Ibid).
35 Tapper, supra note 6, at 120; Dennis, supra note 4, at 419.
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including those dealing with corruption offences such as the offence of illicit 
enrichment and procuring of an undue advantage relate to the type of 
presumption that comes into the picture only after a prosecuting body succeeds 
in establishing (proving) at least some facts that constitute the offence in the 
charge.36 To draw some conclusion (conclusively or provisionally) about the 
existence or non-existence, the truthfulness or falsity of a fact in issue, such 
presumptions with basic facts presuppose a prior establishment or proof of some 
basic fact(s). No such presumption could come into the picture without a prior 
establishment of some basic fact(s). Again, such presumptions could be either 
presumptions of fact or presumptions of law;37 and, presumptions of law could 
be either rebuttable or irrebuttable.
In the case of irrebuttable presumptions of law, the party against whom such 
presumption operates does not have any opportunity to adduce any countering 
or rebuttal evidence. In the case of rebuttable presumption of law, however, the 
party against whom a fact is presumed to exist can adduce evidence to counter 
or rebut those provisionally assumed facts or state of affairs. Rebuttal of 
presumed facts, whether deriving from presumptions of fact or rebuttable 
presumptions of law, may take either of three forms: provisional presumptions, 
evidential presumptions, and persuasive presumptions .38
a) Provisional presumptions
These derive from presumptions of fact. Whether one has to draw a conclusion 
from a proved basic fact is to be determined case by case. Judges may exercise 
their discretionary power either to draw or not to draw a conclusion about the 
existence or non-existence of some presumed fact. Once such an inference is 
drawn, however, the party against whom such a presumption of fact is taken 
bears a provisional or tactical burden. If such party wants to challenge the 
drawing of such a tentative conclusion or wants to avoid a likely risk it has to 
introduce some rebuttal evidence to create some reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of a presumed fact3
b) Evidential Presumptions
Here the law requires judges to draw a conclusion from a proved basic fact. 
Once a basic fact is established, judges must draw a conclusion about the * * * *
36
37
38
39
See for example what Arts 403 and 419 of the Criminal Code of Ethiopia enact.
See Dennis, supra note 4, at 420. In the case of presumptions of fact (provisional 
presumption) conclusions may be drawn from proof of basic facts at the discretion of 
judges while in the case of presumptions of law, the law requires judges to draw 
conclusions from proved basic facts.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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existence of a presumed fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary4 
The conclusion stands intact in the absence of contrary evidence. This form of 
rebuttable presumption of law therefore requires the party against whom such a 
conclusion is drawn to bear evidential burden. This signifies a “shift” or transfer 
of evidential burden from the party that is beneficiary of the presumption to the 
other party. It entails that the party against whom such a conclusion is drawn has 
to adduce sufficient evidence to bring into question the truthfulness of the 
presumed fact, because otherwise judges are required to uphold the drawn 
conclusion.40 41 The presumption vanishes only if such a party introduces some 
rebuttal evidence which puts the presumed fact in doubt. Obviously, such forms 
of presumption do not affect the legal burden of proof that is applicable in the 
proceeding. Emson writes:
An evidential presumption does not affect the incidence of the legal burden 
of proof but places an evidential burden upon the opposing party once 
certain basic facts have been proved or admitted. The party relying on the 
presumption still bears the legal burden of proving the presumed fact but 
this burden will be deemed to have been discharged, and the tribunal of fact 
will be obliged to accept its truth, if the opposing party has failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence to suggest the contrary. if the evidential burden has been 
discharged, the tribunal of fact will have to weigh in the balance the 
probative value of the evidence adduced by the opposing party against that 
of the basic facts and any other evidence adduced by the party bearing the 
legal burden, in order to determine whether the legal burden has been 
discharged [Emphasis added]. 42 43
c) Persuasive Presumptions
Here the law requires judges to draw a conclusion from a proved basic fact 
unless and until such conclusion is disproved by the party disputing it.43 In such 
cases, the party against whom such a conclusion is drawn is required to bear 
persuasive burden on and only on the presumed fact. This signifies a “shift” or 
transfer of legal burden of proof in respect of the presumed fact only. It must be 
noted that there is only “shift” of legal burden of proof in respect of a specified 
(identified) presumed fact. If such a party wants to avoid losing on that
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid; See also Ashworth (supra note 12, at 269) stating: “Discharging the evidential 
burden does place an obligation on the defendant, and for that reason it requires 
justification and should not be casually imposed. But the burden is much lighter than 
the onus of proving an issue on the balance of probabilities, and hence it is less 
objectionable.”
42 Emson, supra note 3, at 461-462.
43 Dennis, supra note 4, at 421.
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presumed fact or on the whole of the case, as the case may be, he has to prove 
the non-existence of the presumed fact. It is not sufficient for such a party to 
merely create doubts as to the truthfulness of the presumed fact. He should 
rather convince on a balance of probabilities that his side of the story is true in 
relation to the presumed fact. Emson notes:
A persuasive presumption is effectively a rule which places the legal burden 
of proof on a particular party once certain basic facts have been proved or 
admitted. The basic facts give rise to the presumed fact, and it is for the 
opposing party to prove the contrary /Emphasis addedy.44
It is thus essential to identify the types of rebuttable presumptions that are 
embodied in statutory laws and to appreciate their specific impacts on specific 
forms of burdens of proof envisaged thereupon by paying particular attention to 
how specific offences have been defined or formulated. Apart from paying good 
attention to terms such as “may”, “must”, “shall”, or any other equivalent term 
in statutory formulations, one has to critically examine whether there are 
expressions such as “.... in the absence of any evidence to the contrary....”, or 
“...unless and until disproved...”. The manner in which rebuttable presumptions 
are formulated in the provisions that articulate particular offences indicate 
intended consequences.
3. The Notion, Kinds and Application of Standards of 
Proof in Criminal Trials
A related concept to the notions of burdens of proof and presumptions is 
standards of proof. Basically the idea of ‘standard of proof is concerned with 
the question of the degree or level to which the facts in issue or relevant facts 
must be proved or, to be shown or supported to exist, as the case may be. It 
refers to “the degree of probability to which facts must be proved to be true.”45 
In criminal proceedings, the principle of presumption of innocence determines 
the essence and roles of such standards. This fundamental principle of criminal 
law and criminal procedure law directs litigating parties to carry out their 
respective burdens of proof; it also determines the standards of proof that has to 
be met by parties.46
The notion of ‘standards of proof may signify different things in various 
contexts. In the loose sense, it connotes different levels or degrees of “proof”. It 
may, for example, signify the extent or level of intensity of the evidence that is 44 45 46
44 Ibid, at 461.
45 Dennis, supra note 4, at 370.
46 Ashworth, supra note 12, at 249; Kitai, supra note 12, at 258; Dlamini, supra note 6, 
at 396.
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required for a party that bears evidential burden to successfully discharge this 
burden and thereby to trigger “shift” of burden of adduction of evidence to the 
other party. In criminal cases, this may arise in two different circumstances.
Firstly (and primarily), it arises in the context of the initial evidential burden 
of the prosecutor. The prosecutor is required to carry out its evidential burden on 
the substantive elements of the offence in its charge on the basis of the principle 
of presumption of innocence and the evidential maxim that ‘he who asserts shall 
prove his assertion’. After the adduction of the evidence of the prosecutor in 
respect of the substantive matters in the charge is over, the evidence is 
provisionally (temporarily) assessed or evaluated bearing in mind the ultimate 
burden of proof which would be used to evaluate the overall evidence at the end 
of the trial. Although proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not the scale a judge is 
employing to measure the intensity of the prosecution’s evidence at this phase of 
the litigation, in actuality the intensity of the evidence is assessed in view of that 
scale. Accordingly, the prosecutor is said to have discharged its evidential 
burden only if it has introduced an amount of evidence that enables the court to 
order the accused to enter into his defence. This standard of proof, often referred 
to as prima facie proof, is a degree of proof that leads into the conviction of the 
accused if the latter fails to introduce any rebuttal or counter evidence for any 
reason, or where the accused who has submitted evidence, fails to introduce an 
amount of evidence that creates such an intensity to spark some doubt(s).
Secondly, in some exceptional circumstances stipulated by law, an evidential 
burden of proof may be imposed upon the accused for some material and/or 
moral elements in certain criminal offences. As already stated, such a measure is 
adopted only in certain justifiable circumstances and only with a view to 
minimize, to some extent, the evidential burden of proof borne by the public 
prosecutor. This pertains to evidential presumptions, which is different from 
those of provisional presumptions as well as persuasive presumptions. The 
degree of “proof” required of the accused in such instances is one which has the 
intensity to raise or create some reasonable doubt(s) as to the existence or 
truthfulness of the presumed fact. in the real sense, it could be argued that the 
accused is not required to create or raise ‘a reasonable doubt’ against the 
prosecutor’s evidence or the presumed fact. it is rather the prosecutor that 
should prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt degree of proof.
There is also another sense of standard of proof. This is what one may find in 
criminal proceedings when judges draw a presumption of fact as to the 
truthfulness (or as to the existence) of some presumed fact thereby imposing 
some tactical burden of proof on an accused in respect of such presumed fact. In 
such instances, accused persons would be required to introduce some rebuttal or 
counter evidence. With regard to the degree of “proof’ that is required to 
discharge such tactical (provisional) burden of proof, (in the strict sense) the 
accused is not under any legal burden of proof in such instances; the accused is
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not expected to convince judges to his side of the story in respect of a presumed 
fact drawn at the discretionary power of judges. No legal obligation is imposed 
on the accused requiring him to prove his innocence or to disprove what is 
presumed to exist. By virtue of the principle of presumption of innocence, it is 
the prosecutor that should convince judges about the actus reus and the mens 
rea elements appearing in the charge. This goes in line with the maxim ‘he who 
asserts [not he who denies] shall prove his assertion’.
This raises the issue as to what is required of the accused in the event of 
tactical burden of proof. As stated earlier, such burden only demands the 
accused to adduce some counter or rebuttal evidence that has a potential 
cogency to spark some doubt(s) against the evidence of the prosecutor or against 
the presumed fact. This is very different from convincing judges about the 
truthfulness of one’s side of the story.47 To a greater extent, we observe that this 
standard of “proof’ is similar to the one that eventuates in cases of evidential 
presumptions.48 Conviction, in both cases, does not depend on the extent of an 
accused person’s defence. Judges pass judgment of conviction only if the 
prosecutor proves the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further still, there is another very rare, theoretically available, form of 
standard of proof which arises under circumstances wherein persuasive 
presumptions may be applicable. Theoretically, the legislative body in a national 
jurisdiction may, arguably, resolve to employ some form of persuasive 
presumptions (reverse persuasive burden) for a few categories of offences that 
pose exceptional severe threats to the public such as in respect of organized 
crime, drug trafficking, crimes of terrorism and public corruption.49 If such a 
measure is to be adopted validly, the law could obligate judges to presume the 
existence of a presumed fact (following the establishment of basic fact(s))
47 See Dennis, supra note 4, at 373 (it only requires to “respond with some rebutting 
evidence”).
48 Evidential burden requires the accused to raise or create reasonable doubt, a standard 
of proof which is much lighter than preponderance of proof (balance of probabilities). 
(See Ashworth, supra note 12, at 269.)
49 Kofele-Kale, supra note 14, at 942-943; Hamer, supra note 30, at 148-149. No 
jurisdiction has so far recognized persuasive presumptions in criminal offences. 
Courts of law have interpreted entrenched presumptions as only amounting to 
evidential presumptions. See Professor Kofele-Kale writing “extant jurisprudence 
reads reverse onus clauses as casting an evidential burden on the accused” despite 
advocating for recognition of persuasive presumptions in some very exceptional 
criminal offences (supra note 14, at 942-943). Ashworth (supra note 12, at 269) also 
wrote “Where courts have found the reverse onus of proof incompatible with the 
presumption of innocence, the relevant provision has generally been reinterpreted as 
imposing only an evidential burden.”
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unless and until an accused person disproves the presumed fact. Such a 
presumption transfers persuasive burden of proof on some fact(s) from the 
prosecutor to the accused.50 If such a measure is to be validly adopted by the 
legislature (which must be made in explicit terms), what standard of proof is to 
be required of an accused to disprove or refute the truthfulness (or the existence) 
of the presumed fact? would it be acceptable or justifiable if the legislature 
determines it to be one of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ degree? What 
would be the implication if such a standard of proof is to be recognized?
These questions are beyond the scope of this note, and it suffices here to 
briefly state that ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard of proof is required 
of the prosecutor to minimize risk of mistaken conviction. Demanding such high 
degree of proof from an accused for the facts presumed otherwise would open 
dangerous loopholes toward the conviction of an accused despite the existence 
of some reasonable doubt. This goes against many fundamental values and 
interests including the principle of presumption of innocence and equality of 
arms. Under such thresholds, innocent persons can be easily convicted for 
merely failing to persuade judges about the contrary version of facts presumed.
Various jurisdictions such as Canada have maintained that requiring an 
accused to bear even a preponderant degree of proof is antithetical to the 
principle of presumption of innocence. In this regard, it has been noted that 
“where the accused bears the burden of proving an essential element of an 
offence on a balance of probabilities, it would be possible for conviction to 
occur despite the existence of a reasonable doubt, if the accused adduces 
sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt but fails to convince 
the jury on the balance of probabilities.”51 As could be gathered from various 
writings of scholars and the case law of other jurisdictions that recognize a 
reasonable limitation of the presumption of innocence under certain justifiable 
circumstances, a preponderance degree of proof suffices to maintain public 
interests without obliterating the fair trial rights of accused persons.52
In the strict and proper sense, the concept of standard of proof in criminal 
trials denotes the ultimate degree or quantum of proof that is required to satisfy
50 Note the distinction between reversal (easing) of evidential burdens of proof and 
reversal (easing) of persuasive burdens of proof. The former only requires the 
accused to raise reasonable doubt while the latter requires him to prove to the 
required standard that the fact presumed does not hold to be true or to exist.
51 See Lilian Y. Y. Ma (1991), ‘Corruption Offences in Hong Kong: Reverse Onus 
Clauses and the Bills of Rights, 21 Hong Kong L. J, at 307-308. To require the 
accused to shoulder more than the balance of probabilities (preponderance degree of 
proof) would be beyond an acceptable degree of tolerance and compromise in any 
modern criminal justice system.
52 Kofele-Kale, supra note 14, at 942-943; Hamer, supra note 30, at 148-149.
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the minds of judges to decide upon the existence or non-existence of an issue of 
fact under inquiry. In this strict sense, the degree of proof which a prosecutor, in 
an adversarial criminal proceeding, bears to obtain conviction is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.53 There is the need to properly understand what this standard 
means in practical terms. It means that in order to convict, judges must be 
almost certain that the crime is committed and that the accused did it. In other 
terms, judges must be overwhelmingly convinced; the probability that the crime 
might not have been committed or the probability that it might not have been 
committed by the accused must be found unlikely5
Concluding Remarks
The principle of the presumption of innocence requires the prosecution to bear 
both initial evidential burden of proof and persuasive or ultimate burden of 
proof in criminal trials. It has to lead evidence and prove each ingredient of the
53 Like the notion of burdens of proof, there are some distinctions in the conceptions 
and applications of the notion of standards of proof between common law and 
continental law jurisdictions. Continental lawyers often employ the expression in 
dubio pro reo (in case of doubt favour the defendant). Unlike ‘a reasonable man’s 
standard’ requirement of the common law and some continental law jurisdictions, 
judges in civil law countries are allowed to use subjective evaluation (intime 
conviction) when they assess and evaluate evidence presented to them. Yet, both 
common law and civil law jurisdictions require highest degree of persuasion to 
convict an accused. Of the three commonly applied degrees of proof recognized in 
judicial proceedings (i.e., ‘preponderance of the evidence’, ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ and ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘in dubio pro reo ’), criminal 
proceedings require the prosecutor to prove the guilt of each accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt or in dubio pro reo. For further conceptual clarity and analysis see, 
for example, Damaska, supra note 2, at 540-544; Dwyer, supra note 5, at 377-404; J. 
P. McBaine, ‘Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief’, 32 Cal. L. Rev. (1944), at 242­
268. See also Christoph Engel (2008-2009), ‘Preponderance of the Evidence versus 
Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict between American and 
Continental European Law’, 33 Vt. L. Rev., at 435ff; Kitai, supra note 12, at 258 
(footnote omitted); Ashworth, supra note 12, at 249.
54 It goes without saying that the judicial search of truth is a matter of probability. So 
far, no society has invented a mechanism that helps ascertaining truth in criminal 
cases an absolute mathematical certainty. See Zuckerman, supra note 7, at 19-28; 
Dennis, supra note 4, at 3, 90-122. Dennis writes (at 3): “Because of the limitations 
of human knowledge ‘truth’ [...] has to be regarded as a question of probability. We 
can never be confident to the point of absolute certainty that our evidence is always 
accurate and complete, and that we have always drawn the correct inferences from it. 
Perfect knowledge is unattainable in an imperfect world. The law, like other fields of 
human inquiry, has to be satisfied with degrees of probability of accurate truth­
finding” (footnote omitted).
270 Mizan Law Review, Vol. 8, No.1 September 2014
offence. It should also establish that the crime is committed and that it is 
committed by the accused with a culpable state of mind.
An accused person, on the other hand, is not required to open the case and to 
lead evidence to show or to prove his innocence. It would be antithetical to the 
principle of presumption of innocence and other fundamental societal values to 
require an accused to make a defense or to disprove guilt (or to prove 
innocence) before the prosecutor has successfully established guilt. Even in 
cases where the prosecutor might have successfully discharged its initial 
evidential burden, the accused is not required to convince judges about the 
truthfulness of his side of story in respect of facts in his defense or to persuade 
the falsity of the prosecution’s evidence, partly or as a whole. Instead, the 
accused is required to raise or spark some doubt against the evidence of the 
prosecutor bearing a tactical burden of proof. Only in exceptional cases is the 
accused required to bear evidential burden of proof in respect of certain material 
and/or moral elements of an offence in a charge. That occurs in cases where the 
law embodies a rebuttable form of presumption (evidential presumption) in 
respect of certain material and/or moral elements of an offence that poses 
serious threats to the public. Under such circumstances where evidential burden 
of proof is imposed on an accused in respect of some elements of an offence, the 
evidential burden of proof of the prosecutor is said to be eased or reduced. In 
such cases the accused is only required to create or raise reasonable doubt, 
which is much lighter than establishing at a balance of probabilities.
As the judicial jurisprudence and the experience of various jurisdictions 
indicate, endorsing persuasive presumptions against accused persons cannot 
stand valid in the face of the fundamental human right to, and principle of, the 
presumption of innocence. The risk of convicting and punishing innocent 
individuals requires society to prefer erring on acquitting criminal persons rather 
than erring on the conviction of innocent persons.
By virtue of the operation of the presumption of innocence, the prosecutor is 
required to convince judges by creating such an intensity of belief in their minds 
that the crime stated in the charge is committed by the accused with a 
blameworthy state of mind. This persuasion of the guilt of the accused should 
indeed reach at the standard of proof envisaged by and compatible with the 
principle of presumption of innocence. The degree of proof envisaged by this 
principle as a prerequisite for conviction and punishment is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. _______■
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